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Only four cases which might be classified under the heading of
Administrative Law were decided by the court during the period of
this survey. None involved any novel questions of administrative
law. All were concerned with the application of well established
rules to particular fact situations. In so far as consequences are
concerned, the most important was South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Harbiu' in which the court invalidated the suspen-
sion of a driver's license on the basis of the Department's "point
system".
2
In the Harbin case3 the court held that the statute4 under which
the Department had issued its regulations establishing the point sys-
tem was unconstitutional in that it failed to provide a sufficient guide
by which the power delegated to the Department was to be exer-
cised. Having found that the statute in question provided for "no
standard except the personal judgment of the administrative officers
of the Department",5 the application of the "general rule, [that] a
statute which in effect reposes an absolute, unregulated and unde-
fined discretion in an administrative body bestows arbitrary powers
and is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers",6 was conclu-
sive of the result. As a guide to future challenges of legislative
delegation the case offers nothing more than the court's recogni-
tion of the difficulty of formulating any precise test:
The degree to which a legislative body must specify its poli-
cies and standards in order that the administrative authority
granted may not be an unconstitutional delegation of its own
legislative power is not capable of precise definition.7 Never-
theless, uncertainty in this area of the law would seem to be
a necessary concomitance of the flexibility essential to a success-
ful constitutional system.
OAssociate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 86 S.E. 2d 466 (S.C. 1955).
2. The point system provided that any licensee accumulating a total of ten
points was subject to having his driver's license revoked without further cause.
The points were accumulated for specified traffic violations in accordance with
a fixed schedule of points for each violation or warning by a patrolman.
3. 86 S.E. 2d 466 (S.C. 1955).
4. "For cause satisfactory to the Department it may suspend, cancel or re-
voke the driver's license of any person for a period of not more than one
year . . . ." CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-172.
5. 86 S.E. 2d 466, 471 (S.C. 1955).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 470.
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In affirming an order of the Public Service Commission requir-
ing the defendant railroad to enlarge its loading platform at Lynch-
burg, the court, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission8 reiterated the rules that the orders of the com-
mission will be set aside only when shown to be arbitrary and that
its findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be set aside
unless clearly against the weight of the evidence.
In Dunbar v. City of Spartanburg9 the petitioner's demand for
rezoning of a certain area in the city was denied by that city's coun-
cil after a public hearing. It was held that the action of a city
council in refusing to amend an ordinance is the exercise of a legis-
lative function and therefore is not subject to judicial review; no more
so than would be the like refusal by the legislature to act on a similar
request. The court also pointed out that the petitioner failed to pursue
the remedy available to him by petition to the Board of Adjustment
for an exemption from the zoning ordinance before resorting to the
courts and thus was not entitled to a writ of certiorari- an appli-
cation of what the court might have identified as the familiar doc-
trine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies".
Holding that a circuit judge had no authority to review a sus-
pension of a driver's license which was made mandatory by a sta-
tute, in Herndon v. South Carolina State Highway Department,10
the court revoked an order of the circuit judge permitting the li-
censee to drive while engaged in the performance of his duties as a
laundry truck driver despite the suspension by the Department. In
doing so the court held that Section 46-17811 does not apply to the
mandatory suspensions required by Section 46-34812 and disapproved
the dicta in the earlier case of Folsom v. South Carolina State High-
way DepartmentIs which indicated otherwise.
8. 226 S.C. 136, 84 S.E. 2d 132 (1954).
9. 85 S.E. 2d 281 (S.C. 1954).
10. 85 S.E. 2d 287 (S.C. 1955).
11. "Any person denied a license or whose license has been suspended, can-
celed or revoked may file an application within thirty days thereafter for a
hearing in the matter before a circuit judge . . . and such court or judge is
hereby vested with jurisdiction . . . to determine whether the applicant is
entitled to a license .... ." Cone OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-178.
12. "The Department shall suspend the driver's license of any person who
is convicted, receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or forfeits bail posted for
the violation of Section 46-343 or . . . any other law . . . that prohibits any
person from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor . . ." CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-348.
13. 196 S.C. 167, 13 S.E. 2d 130, 133 (1941).
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